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Autonomy and Care in Medicine
Hille Haker
Department of Theology, Loyola University Chicago, USA

Abstract
This paper argues that the core principle of bioethics, autonomy, is rooted both in the 20th
century history of the development of new medical technologies as in political liberalism
transferred to medical practices, rendering the medical decision-making of patients a
centerpiece of medical interventions. The paper shows how the ambiguity in the
interpretation of autonomy reflects the ambivalence of bioethics towards making normative
claims on the moral agents insofar as these go beyond the respect for a patient’s autonomy. In
the second part, the paper analyzes the alternative approach of care ethics, which intends to
emphasize both the vulnerability and dependency of the patient and the medical professions’
responsibility to care for the patient. However, neither ‘autonomy’ nor ‘care’ ethics
approaches can address the social and institutional mediations of today’s health care ethics;
the paper therefore concludes with a proposal to embrace a critical social-ethical approach to
bioethics that is based on the tradition of human rights.
Keywords: bioethics, autonomy, care, political liberalism, responsibility, human rights
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Introduction
Societal practices, including numerous practices in the health care sector, have radically
changed during the second half of the 20th century. The changes certainly concern human
reproduction, the prolonging of life with the help of modern medical technologies, and the
social practices surrounding the process of dying. Even the concept of life and death have
changed over the course of the last century, and a utilitarian economic reason that
accompanied modern industrial societies since the 19th century, has reached the sphere of
medicine, too: how we handle the human body in medical prevention, diagnosis, and therapy
echoes the automation of other non-medical technical processes; the human corpse is more
and more utilized for organ transplantation; but also body parts such as blood, sperm or egg
cells, or human tissue are used in the ever-demanding processes of medical cures. Modern
society’s hospitals sometimes resemble large industrial complexes, and even small medical
practices may use more technical devices than a person might ever see in his or her everyday
life. In sum, the institutional changes that medicine has gone through over the last century are
dramatic, and it is not so clear whether medical ethics, as it is known today, embraces the
complexities of these changes, especially when it predominantly is framed as ‘individual
ethics’. In this article, I will show how the ambiguity of the interpretation of autonomy results
in an ambivalence of what exactly moral claims are moral agents, namely patients, are faced
with and I will then complement and, in part, juxtapose the principle of respect of autonomy
with the medical professionals’ responsibility to care for a patient. Both concepts, however,
cannot claim to address the social and institutional questions of today’s health care ethics,
and hence I will conclude that to connect both concepts of autonomy and care with a socialethical approach to bioethics is the most challenging task ahead.

Bioethics as an Answer to Societal Change in 20th Century
Questions of bioethics are part of the broader ethical reflection that embraces different
changes of social practices in modern societies. In the discipline of bioethics and biomedical
ethics, which originated in Northern America in the 1950s,1 the shifts and changes of the
medical practices due to the development and application of new technologies are examined
in historical, cultural, or anthropological studies, including the analyses of the transformative
processes and the emergence of new norms in different contexts. Sociological analyses
describe societal changes, e.g. shifts with respect to values and beliefs, and psychological
studies examine, among others, the impact of these changes on the personal identity, their
coping strategies with illness, etc. In the traditional labor division between descriptive and
normative disciplines, philosophy, theology and law are the classical disciplines to critically
evaluate the normative dimension of practices by means of rational argumentation.
While medical ethics has always been part of medical practice, it was newly
constructed after World War II. It emerged as corrective to the crimes committed by
physicians during the Nazi dictatorship, but with the development of new medical
technologies, biomedical ethics began to add to the critique of disrespect for human rights the
underlying paternalism in all traditional clinical medicine. Moreover, since individual
1

(Jonsen 1998).
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freedom was largely considered to be the core social value of US society, relying on the
physicians’ virtues and individual responsible behavior appeared not only to be dubious in
light of the recent history but also seemed to contradict the freedom right of sovereign
citizens in modern societies. Health care providers were more and more seen as providing the
means for patients to realize their choices in situations of illness and disease. Furthermore,
the principle of well-being, which had served as the over-arching norm of medical action for
centuries and considered the core principle of traditional medical ethics, (articulated, for
example, in the principle: “Salus aegroti suprema lex”), seemed to belong to a paternalistic
medical ethics rather than to the new framework of an autonomy-based ethics. While wellbeing is certainly still guiding the physician’s every-day practice, it became, above all, a
problem in the contested cases of biomedical ethics: especially in the conflicts concerning life
and death, the course of action, it was held, should be determined by the patient rather than
by the physician or anybody else. According to the revised biomedical ethics, respect for the
patient’s autonomy is paramount in the doctor-patient-relationship and expected to create
exactly the trust that is needed in this asymmetric relationship; in practice, however, this
respect is often merely spelled out as the signature on the consent form. Nevertheless, respect
for the patient’s autonomy reflects a radical change in the underlying concept of medical
actions concerning the status of the traditional principle of well-being.
The re-orientation of the traditional medical virtue ethics by way of the establishment
of several institutional Codes of Conduct, political oversight of new technologies, and the reevaluation of traditional medical ethics was met by a major methodological 'milestone' when
Tom Beauchamp and James Childress published their ‘Foundations of biomedical ethics’ in
1977, which is now in its sixth edition, each of which responded to the critics of the
approach.2 It was assumed that by constructing foundational “middle principles”, both the
theoretical and practical needs of medical ethics could be met without burdening bioethics
with the commitment to a particular moral tradition or religious belief system. The authors
hoped that on the basis of plural traditions, the principles of bioethics could be negotiated and
serve as a normative reference for the new discipline of bioethics. By aid of the four
principles, autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence, and justice, norms were to be set up for
most changed areas of medical practice, namely ethical issues at the beginning of life, at the
end of life, or genetic testing. Together with legal norms, the principles were supposed to
guide the clinical decision-making procedures ‘at the bedside’. From the beginning, however,
legal-ethical deliberations dominated the debates, framing the bioethics discourse as analysis
about a physician’s right action and the scope of legal regulations. In the very famous case of
Karen Ann Quinlan, for example, her parents, the legal guardians, sought to end her treatment
after several months because she had not responded to any effort to help her regain
consciousness – the court ultimately ruled in favor of her parents’ wishes. This case became a
test case for biomedical ethics in the new ‘era’ of life-sustaining technologies, and unless the
more casuistic methodology of Catholic moral theology was applied, bioethical questions
were framed in view of liberal political philosophy. Mostly, they were seen as conflicts
between freedom rights on the one hand – hence respect for a patient’s autonomy (sometimes
represented by her guardians) interpreted mainly as negative freedom right, i.e. the right not
2
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to be hindered by the state or medical institution to act in accordance with her wishes – and
protection rights on the other hand, i.e. an institution’s or state’s duty to protect the life and
well-being of citizens. This conflict between different kinds of rights is not unusual in liberal
political philosophy; what is not so clear, however, is whether this framework of political
liberalism is appropriate in order to interpret modern medical ethical conflicts.
Beauchamp and Childress’s book is certainly the best-known approach to biomedical
ethics; it joins the long list of US American bioethics books that presuppose the modern
liberal framework, even when disagreeing whether a more deontological or consequentialist
approach should be taken. And although the book was critiqued from philosophers especially
for its reliance on a ‘common morality’, with the spread of the discipline of bioethics to
almost every country of the world, the underlying framework has become the most influential
methodology within biomedical ethics. Moreover, very soon the "four principles approach"
succeeded in providing an instrument to ethically structure complex ethical issues in such a
way that they can be regulated. Given the heavy influence of the six editions of the book so
far, it is probably not too far-fetched to say that it has had the intended effect, even though
today, the question of just distribution of resources (and hence the question of political and
economic ethics) and the challenge of global justice (and hence the relation of political ethics,
governance, and economics) reflects a shift in the bioethics debate towards the methodologies
of social and institutional ethics. Bioethics, it is claimed today from a Foucauldian
perspective, is also always biopolitics, mirroring not only the historically contingent and ever
shifting relation, for example, between religious communities and the state, but also the
pragmatic focus of bioethics as consultant and adviser of political bodies. While these
approaches claim that the clinical-ethical approach, which is centered on the physicianpatient relationship and their interaction, is far too narrow given the complexity of health care
and governance of individual’s health, the principle of autonomy, as introduced in the early
works of bioethics, is still considered to be the core principle of the discipline.3

The critique of autonomy as preferential autonomy
In the context of medicine the concept of what I will call preferential autonomy is defined as
respect for the desire and the preferences of a patient – whatever these may be, limited solely
by the respect for the preferences of others. This respect has replaced, as I said, the shared
notion of ‘well-being’ that formed the basis of action in the traditional medical ethics. In that
paradigm, it was the physician’s expertise that determined whether and how an illness or
disease could be transformed into what Heinz Georg Gadamer called the ‘equilibrium’ of
bodily functions and the subjective sense of ‘feeling healthy’.4 In this conceptual framework,
the patient would trust the doctor or medical team to take care of the necessary steps to reach
this status of equilibrium – or at least to try everything possible to restore his or her wellbeing – at the price of not knowing or not understanding a physician’s actions. As Onora
O’Neill has argued convincingly, ‘trust’ is a necessary ingredient of the doctor-patientrelationship,5 while mistrust is poisonous for a relationship that exposes the one partner to
3
4
5

For a good overview of the discussion on autonomy in bioethics cf. (Tauber 2005).
Cf. (Gadamer 1996).
Cf. (O'Neill 2002).
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potentially painful physical and psychical interventions by the other – in a culture that values
individual freedom highly, a return to the traditional virtue-ethics paradigm seems to be
impossible unless it leaves enough space for information and consent. While this is not
questioned, the exact interpretation of autonomy is subject to many contemporary debates.
The concept of a patient’s preferential autonomy, which echoes the social value order
of Western societies’ individualism, requires a medically and ethically competent patient: If
the choice is considered as a patient’s self-determination of action, this changes the
physician’s role dramatically, even reversing the asymmetry between the doctor and the
patient in matters of ethical decisions. Again, in more traditional settings, this may not
become a big problem, because it will still be the ‘well-being’ that drives the decision and the
patient will most certainly rely upon the expertise of the physician. But in the biomedical
setting of today’s health care provisions, this may easily change, because health and illness
become much more ambiguous concepts: for example, in genetic testing, dispositions to
develop diseases in the future may serve as cause for actions (preventive screenings,
abortions, or preventive surgery are examples of such interventions), even though no actual
disease is at stake. The ethical decision can therefore not be guided by a person’s well-being
as equilibrium of health (already) disrupted by a disease; rather, the decision involves the
assessment of risks and the probability of a disease to manifest; decisions may involve the
assessment of one’s future quality of life, as this is, for example, the case in prospective
living wills. In all these cases, medical experts can give statistical information, but since
quality of life is difficult – if at all possible – to quantify, the necessary decisions do not only
concern ‘objective’ criteria but rather individual preferences of how a person wishes to live
with regard to possible medical options. In such a scenario that is rather the standard of
biomedical decision-making than the exception, doctors and patients may in fact rather be
‘moral strangers’ than sharing a social understanding of health and disease.6
Since the value of an individual’s freedom to act is considered as the ‘highest good’
of the modern (Western) ethics that in return shapes the normative principle of respect, the
flipside of the value of individual autonomy is therefore ethical pluralism. Tolerance or
respect is the normative response to this pluralism. As a result, the dominant liberal medical
ethics emphasizes the normative implication of autonomy for physicians or caregivers: they
not only need to refrain from any action that could interfere with the patient’s own desire or
interest but also from reasoning with the patient about underlying value judgments of their
interests. Conversations are to be ‘non-directive’ lest they risk manipulating the patient’s
sovereign choice. The effect of this change is a moral ‘neutralization’ of the doctor-patient
relationship, and often health care institutions retreat to a formalized procedure to ensure a
patient’s consent to medical interventions.
Despite of the problems to implement appropriate procedures, preference autonomy
seems to ‘fit’ well with modern societies.7 However, while individuals may interpret their
preferences as 'authentic' desires, they are in fact socially mediated: preferences are at least in
part shaped by social values and social norms. As I have argued, in an environment of ‘moral
6

7

For H.T. Engelhardt modern societies ‘produce’ moral strangers and this is a strong motive for him to
establish the principle of respect for the autonomy of all in his influential book: (Engelhardt 1986).
For a defense of preferentialism from a utilitarian perspective cf. (Singer 2011); for a critique of the
‘modern self’ cf.(Taylor 1992, Taylor 1992).
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strangers’ or moral pluralism, these mediations can hardly be addressed – but this does not
mean that the ‘liberal self’ comes without attributes: the concept of preference autonomy
implicitly (or explicitly) assumes that a patient is a particular agent: sovereign, free, and well
able to choose among several goods. But this self-concept turns out to be merely an idealized
image of the modern citizen that political liberalism has depicted; while political liberalism
turns to the relation of the individual and the state, bioethical liberalism is heavily influenced
by the citizen as participant in civil society. In modern societies, these are for a good part
defined as market societies, in which the individual will cooperate with others while pursuing
her own interests – and it is this social practice that liberal bioethics seems to presuppose,
while transferring it to the sphere of health care. Preference autonomy may be an appropriate
concept when applied to the consumer market, but it distorts the reality of patients in need of
help, because it cannot attend to the vulnerability that accompanies illness, and it cannot
attend to the constitutive relational and social character of human life. To this aspect, I will
return below. But there are other reasons to question an over-simplified interpretation of the
concept of autonomy from an ethical perspective:
First, freedom as such may well serve as an anthropological concept to describe the
conditio humana – but without further specification it cannot serve as a moral principle. For
this reason, Immanuel Kant defined autonomy not along the line of individual preferences but
rather along the line of moral reasoning: moral autonomy, as a basic category in moral
philosophy, is the concordance of the agent’s moral maxims (the action-guiding, yet noncategorical, preference-based principles) and the categorically binding moral law, which
ought to be comprehensible by everyone; defining autonomy as the foundation of morality,
Kant did not think of the individual’s freedom to pursue her happiness; rather, he addressed
the freedom of a person to ‘construct’ the moral laws that regulate (and motivate) actions,
analogue to natural laws that cause events to happen. The distinction between preferential
autonomy and moral autonomy is therefore crucial: preferences as such have no moral
qualification; hence it can be right or wrong to respect them. In contrast, moral autonomy is
practical freedom, demanding not only that an agent herself acts morally (in accordance with
the categorical principle, i.e. justified with a claim to universal validity) but also that she is
respected in this ‘dignity’ – the capability to act morally.8
In the last decades, this moral approach to autonomy was elaborated further from two
important sides without turning to the concept of preferential autonomy. Discourse ethics
critiqued the Kantian justification procedure for its monological structure of reasoning, and it
transformed the process of reasoning to a dialogical procedure of deliberation, as
argumentative discourse. Although this approach was developed as a political ethics, it can be
useful for biomedical ethics, too: in clinical ethics, it is, for example, echoed in the concept of
‘shared decision-making’, which transcends the imperative of non-directive interactions.
Second and more radically, however, phenomenological ethics questioned the
universalization of maxims. It takes up Kant’s turn to obligations and reformulates it as

8

In recent years, Ch. Korsgaard has supported O’Neill’s Kantian approach that prioritizes duties over rights,
arguing that Kant’s ethics is not only necessary for moral reasoning, but it can indeed be constructed as a
‘necessary’ part of a person’s self-identity. Cf. (Korsgaard 2009).
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responsibility.9 In this approach, the response to the ‘other’ takes precedence over the selfrelated actions that include the other via universalization only. In the bioethical context this
means that both patients and health care providers need to ask what responsibilities arise in a
given situation; a patient may even conceive of herself as other, resulting in the obligation to
care for herself, while physicians will need to ask what they ‘owe the other’, the patient.
Autonomy is thereby closely linked to the concept of responsibility; the latter, however, is
better equipped to attend to a patient’s loss (or lack) of sovereignty that so often accompanies
the experience of illness.
A second reason to transcend the concept of preference autonomy concerns the
concept of free choice in the context of health care services. Biotechnologies which have
become more and more part of the current medical practice are a good example of the easily
crossed line between the rhetoric of ‘free’ choice and the shaping of this choice by market
strategies; for medical products are often very expensive, and they are predominantly owned
by companies that need to make profit. Such companies have a vested interest to identify
potential consumers for their biomedical products or procedures in preventive, diagnostic,
and therapeutic medicine. Whatever is declared to be in the patient’s “interest”, is also part of
and subject to a system of economic incentives and motifs, all based on the assumption that
one will first develop the goods that then will find the consumer. Seen from the institutional
or social-ethical perspective, however, individual choices are not only mediated socially but
rather, needs are sometimes created rather than discovered, in order to create a market for its
products.10 A powerful example of this dynamic within the medical sector is the drug Viagra
that was developed as medication for a specific sexual condition, but once it marketed, it was
broadly advertised as a lifestyle drug for an ageing male population. Within few years, the
drug has radically changed the attitude towards and the perception of sex in an ageing
society.11 Commodification, it seems, has also long taken the lead in reproductive
technologies: For example, sex-selection in early pregnancy was developed as part of medical
genetics to determine sex-related risks, as in Duchenne muscular dystrophy. By now,
companies sell test kits for no more than $25 online. Adding lab fees and shipping costs,
these tests can be bought for $250-300. According to a review study that was published in
August 2011 in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), non-invasive
blood-tests are highly reliable with respect to the determination of the offspring’s sex; they
may pave the way to offer future parents the choice to determine the sex of their future
child.12 Furthermore, in several countries, the most popular of which is India that has a
booming market in this area, children are purchased from surrogate mothers changing the
‘conception’ of a child. With respect to enhancement technologies, biochemical or
neurological stimulants are heavily marketed. As a clear-cut separation between patients’
needs and consumers’ interests is impossible, the distinction between treating a patient and
9

10

11
12

(Levinas 1998). For a more thorough analysis of the critique of liberal bioethics via an ethics of
responsibility cf. (Haker 2008).
Medical sociologist Peter Conrad argues that the transformation of the ‘traditional’ medicine to a marketoriented medicine is the most striking feature of modern medicine – this analysis raises important questions
for the concept of preferential autonomy as brought forward by Anglo-Saxon bioethics. I will return to this
below. Cf. (Conrad 2005, Conrad 2008).
Cf. (Loe 2004).
(Devaney 2011).
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satisfying a consumer is more and more blurred. Nevertheless, the rhetoric and health renders
the marketing of new products or services more acceptable. Today, commodification in the
health care sector is a challenge that bioethics must attend to in its overall analyses of
individual autonomy.13
A third argument that questions the interpretation of autonomy as preference
autonomy concerns the cultural shaping of basic concepts of human existence by the socalled life sciences. In contrast to the ever smaller role that cultural and religious traditions
play in interpreting human existence, the scientific approach to human life in biology, though
necessary within that discipline, becomes the dominant paradigm to understand human life –
and shapes a new cultural understanding. For instance, in the 1960s, human death was
defined as brain death, at least partly in order to enable organ transplantation, with the result
that today ethical questions concerning the treatment of brain-dead persons predominantly
concern the ‘harvesting’ of their organs and not, for example, new ways to deal with the
dying person in a highly automated environment.14 In the Life Sciences, human body parts,
tissue, or gametes are necessarily conceived as mere body material in order to have them
available as medical resources; the existential perspective may easily be dismissed. From an
ethical perspective, this necessarily reductionist scientific view must be complemented with
the phenomenological insight of ‘embodiment’: a patient not only ‘has’ a body among other
bodies; a patient ‘is’ her body that she experiences as ‘hers’ in a non-instrumental,
experiential way.15 Given the dominant perspective of biology as normative framework in
defining the meaning of human life, the human body becomes a crucial site of
anthropological self-understanding. In Foucault´s analysis of power this dynamic has been
appropriately described as “biopolitics.” The normative shifts are not based on power as
domination but rather pass through the bodies of individuals. They are adopted “freewillingly,” but still form “regimes of power,” which Foucault described as
“governmentalities”.16 An ethics based purely on the respect of individual autonomy has no
means by which it can analyze this self-induced dynamic of power.17 Bioethics must,
however, be able to attend to the psychic, social and cultural dimensions which shape the
overall understanding of human existence, and it needs to contextualize the life sciences’
perspective in this endeavor.
Without a critical method of reflection of these dynamics, ethics loses its capacity for
the normative analysis and assessment that ultimately is aimed at orientating individual
agents in their actions. Contrary to philosophers who want to merely embrace the Kantian
concept of moral autonomy, I am convinced that Kant’s approach alone is not sufficient to
normatively address, for example, the commercialization of biomedicine and the cultural
transformation of our societies by way of the life-sciences.
13
14

15
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(Honneth 2008), (Dickenson 1997, Dickenson 2009).
The role of relatives in the process of determining the brain death of a person is almost always reduced to
the decision about organ transplantation; the dramatic experience of the death of a beloved person in the
environment of an IUC is not part of the debate and left to psychological studies. Ethics, however, also
concerns the ‘ars moriendi’ and includes practices of accompanying a person’s death. In the legal-ethical
framing of bioethical questions, there is not much room for such reflections.
(Vetlesen 2009, Merleau-Ponty 1962).
(Burchell 1991).
The dialectic of power as both heteronous and self-constituting feature is explored further by (Butler
1997).
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Care for the ‘vulnerable’ as corrective of an ethics of autonomy?
Let me now very shortly turn to the ethics of care. For the last decades, the ethics of the
liberal understanding of autonomy has been criticized from yet another angle that I have not
presented so far: feminist ethics as well as several religious ethics approaches claimed that
the emphasis on autonomy ignores the relatedness and interdependency of persons.18
Furthermore, these critics hold that the autonomy model stresses a self-confident agent who
knows what he wants (sic!) and demands that his interests are met by caregivers and medical
professionals – all this in a situation that is in fact more defined in terms of dependency,
vulnerability, and suffering than by the sovereignty of agency that the autonomy concept
suggests. As much as respect is needed in order to acknowledge the freedom-rights of
patients, their need for the care provided by others must not be forgotten. Starting with
different kinds of inter-relations between persons, their inter-dependency and the specific
vulnerability of patients in the context of medical services, the ethics of care concludes:
ethical reflection must not start with the assumption of an ‘atomic’, i.e. un-related, a-social
self-determination. As I have said above, phenomenological ethics, too, has presented a
radical critique of autonomy as conceptual starting point of either the self or of ethics,
reversing ethical reflection from the ‘ethics of the self’ to an ‘ethics of the other’, or an ethics
of responsibility. This reversal seems to resonate well with some newer versions of an ethics
of care, because it precludes bioethics from being received as just the return to an ethics of
common values, shared understandings of well-being or ‘objective’ standards of care. Even if
the concept of individual autonomy may be useful in other contexts, ethicists have claimed
that it misrepresents the existential status of a person who in the medical context has turned
into a patient.
But it is not only the reversal from rights to needs and responsibilities that matters in
care ethics. Defenders of this approach argue that different kinds of principle-based moral
theories are constrained by the rationalistic frameworks of justification so that they miss the
point of moral practice.19 Ethics, they claim, concerns the sometimes monological, more often
dialogical or collective deliberation about the appropriate response to a given situation – and
this response cannot be found in a textbook of normative reasoning but needs to be partly
informed by the given situation, the persons involved, and the ‘creative imagination’ about
the patient’s well-being.20 According to this approach, the patient’s right to be cared for (i.e.
to be assisted in her autonomy, flourishing or well-being) transforms into a positive duty: it is
not enough only to passively respect the other’s needs but they must be met by way of action,
response. This response, however, must be acted out as ‘responsible response’. Since any
action needs to be justified, the patients’ needs, the agents’ values and conviction,
professional standards, ethical principles and legal constraints all enter into the ethical
18

19
20

Cf., among others, the following studies that emphasize the concept of care: (Clement 1996, Conradi 2001,
Donchin 1999, Held 1995, Levine 2001, Mackenzie 2000, Kittay Feder 2002).
Cf. for a summary: (Dodds 2007).
I call this ‘creative imagination’ because I do not believe that we always have clear understandings of what
our well-being may involve. However, in a given situation that constrains the scope of action by various
conditions, I am convinced we come up with at least the relevant factors of well-being. Yet, we may well
prioritize the elements differently. But that is a concern for the actual decision-making process and not for
the notion of our well-being.
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analysis; the patient’s perspective alone is certainly not to overrule all other deliberations,
while his or her dignity, spelled out in specific rights, is in fact inalienable.21
So, if care ethics is concerned with responsible responses that are meant to meet the
needs of another person – how are these defined? Susan Dodds argues that care is still to be
oriented towards a person’s or patient’s autonomy:
The provision of care can be defined as activity undertaken with the aim of providing
an individual with the social, material and emotional supports that either allow that
person to flourish as far as is possible, or (as far as possible) to bring the life of a
person with some recognized physical, cognitive, psychological disability into a
position where their autonomy can be realized.22
Dodds is quick to add that autonomy is not always the goal of care. In some cases it may well
be a rather restricted meaning of flourishing, as is the case in the care for persons with severe
mental disabilities, or people in the so-called persistent vegetative status, or persistent coma.
Dodds’ normative basis, however, is the claim that the existential vulnerability relates the
care-giver to the care-receiver in an un-altruistic way because of the underlying interdependency or a shared vulnerability that differs only in times and degrees of the need. Most
care-ethicists seem to share this view.
As much as this re-turn to the concern for the patients’ needs can be embraced, it can
be doubted whether its inherent focus on personal relationships can address the current
challenges of the medical system. Rather, a systemic, ‘managerial’ ethics has taken over, it
has been argued, “setting the stage for formations of collective actions by a large number of
individuals”,23 whose individual actions must be organized and coordinated. Furthermore,
contrary to its’ proponents’ implicit assumption of inter-dependency, its normative status in
medical ethics is at least as unclear as in the counterpart approach of an ethics of autonomy.24
For care ethics may easily fall into two traps: first, caregivers may take the patient’s
articulation of her need as the guiding norm of their provision of care – in this case it is not
different from taking serious a patient’s interests as articulated in the liberal autonomy-based
ethics; second, the caregiver might determine the patient’s needs herself and shape the
content, scope and limits of what she considers to be a responsible care without giving the
patient’s voice priority. The only circumvention of the first trap is to engage the patient in a
conversation about needs, rights, and obligations, the threshold of acceptable actions and the
limits of what the caregiver is able or willing to give. This could be called a hermeneutical
process about the specific needs and actions, including values, rights, duties, and respect on
both sides. This brings us back to a critical hermeneutics that tries to decipher the social
norms that may inform the emergence of needs, and the competency to weigh the personal
narratives to the normative, universalistic rights’ perspective.
To avoid the second trap, paternalism, is certainly more difficult when a
hermeneutical conversation cannot take place, and imagination or empathy must complement
21
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Cf. for a recent collection of essays concerning the theory of dignity and its possible foundational status in
bioethics (Pellegrino 2009).
(Dodds 2007), p. 501.
(Stirrat 2005), p. 128.
For an insightful critique of common care-ethical approaches cf. (Paley 2011).
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the normative reflection. This may be the case when patients are not able to articulate their
needs due to their medical condition, their young age, or mental capability. Since we can
almost always presuppose that patients are not unrelated beings but embedded in different
webs of relations, it may often be feasible to consult with these relevant other persons, and
bioethics has developed (along the lines of an autonomy-based ethics) the so-called standard
of best interest that care ethics may counter with the standard of best care. The normative
limit of the care-ethics, however, is the same as it is for the ethics of autonomy: this is the
inalienable dignity of the patient that must be respected, and that must be particularly
respected in situations of increased vulnerability. Everything is dependent, then, on how we
can conceive of dignity in the context of bioethics, and moreover, how dignity is spelled out
in different kinds of human rights.

The return of the question of methods
The limits of both autonomy and care ethics approaches show that bioethics needs to broaden
the methodological framework within which medical-ethical questions are negotiated. I see a
trend in contemporary approaches to bioethics to rather describing various individual values
and social norms than normatively evaluating them. Ignoring this specific task, more and
more empirical studies replace normative analyses; they tacitly operate on the belief that a)
since pluralistic societies need to respect the patient’s will, empirical studies can shed light on
what individuals think; furthermore, surveys exploring a population’s stance on particular
practices are instruments of deciphering social values and norms; these, in turn, are taken as
an important basis for legal regulations in democratic societies. The flaw of this approach is
not so much that its informative value is limited – this holds true of any empirical study or
poll; rather it confuses the majority votes with the validity of moral claims. A critical ethics
based on the foundational principle of dignity and human rights cannot knuckle down to
majority views; rather, it has to argue for the justification of moral claims. Many studies in
bioethics overlook this task of normative justification altogether. But while ethics certainly
needs to interpret existential experiences and social practices, it also needs to offer a
normative framework to determine, for example, the correlation of freedom and
responsibility.
Certainly, descriptive and comparative studies are an indispensable part of what I call
a critical hermeneutical ethics. As such, bioethical approaches and approaches in cultural
anthropology, ethnology and social sciences will coexist parallel to each other, and they will
strive to overcome the current deficit that often exists because they remain unconnected.25
However, in addition to the descriptive depiction of normative orders or the critical analysis
of social practices, the reflection on normativity is indispensable. Hence, the critical
hermeneutical ethics is to be complemented with a normative ethics that I call a historically
sensitive universalistic human rights approach.
A number of bioethicists who have confronted the question of normativity refer to a
theory of a deliberative democracy, leaving foundational ethical questions to a discourse
model of decision-making. But as much as this may be a possible (democratic) procedure for
political decisions, it does not suffice for the bioethical normative reflection. Insofar as ethics
25

(Durante 2009).
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is not political theory, even though both disciplines of philosophy are connected in their
objects of research, the equation of consensus and the justification of moral claims is flawed.
For, to mention but one critique of any kind of discourse ethics, which is raised by feminist
ethics as well as critical ethics: the emphasis on discourse is not as innocent as it appears to
be, because it underestimates the factual power relations and power structures, especially
with respect to the fundamental categories of sex, class, or race.26 This deficiency seems to
shake the entire architecture of a procedural ethics that is founded on the capability to
articulate one’s claims in the public realm, and brings us back to the underlying conflict of an
ethics of autonomy and an ethics of responsibility. Although I certainly cannot argue for it
here, I believe that the most promising resolution to this methodological dilemma is a
combination of a critical hermeneutics (that examines the factual inequalities, social norms
and normative orders) and the universalistic human rights approach (that is the underlying
framework of discourse ethics, too, which is constructed to secure the freedom rights of any
participant in social practices).
For such a qualified universalism based on human rights theories, the varying
contexts are acknowledged in informing the understanding of “human existence”. The
fundamental principle of this approach is human dignity, spelled out in the various kinds of
human rights: basic rights, protection rights, freedom rights, and claim rights. The advantage
of this approach rests on the fact that human rights ethics does not necessarily assume the
theoretical coherence of values but takes at its starting point the historically established
human rights frameworks. They refer, for example, to the qualified and codified catalogue of
Human Rights Declarations, which the vast majority of nations have acknowledged and
confirmed – and which are open to additions and further differentiation. In my own view, the
normative implications of historical, yet critical reasoning must be spelled out more
specifically in this endeavor,27 and this can only be done in closely examining and adhering to
historical experiences: as the origin of human rights lies in a specific European tradition and
historical experience, this can and should be explicated and articulated. This origin does not
weaken the justification, to the contrary, it strengthens it: instead of viewing human rights in
terms of a naturalization of ultimately Eurocentric values, their origin ought to serve as a
point of departure in a dialogical process of understanding and appreciation, contextualizing
the normative framework within a specific historical experience it and opening it up to
comparative studies. Justification of normative claims cannot be successful without this turn
to historical reason; but historical experiences alone cannot legitimize moral claims without
turning to a concept of ‘qualified universalism’ that is grounded in the equality of all human
beings but takes its starting point in the experience of injustice.28 While this normative
26
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For a defense of this Kantian-based and yet procedural normative ethics, see (Forst 2007), and a critique of
it in (Honneth 2011).
(Honneth 2011).
Cf. (Shklar 1990).This is where the theological-ethics discourse should be located as well. The Christian
ethical “Option for the Poor” refers to a theologically grounded partiality, which focuses ethical attention
on marginalization and exclusion, on unequal structures and the perpetuation of unequal balances of power.
This ethical focus within the Christian ethic is connected to the attribute of God´s compassion and concern
for justice, which translates into a practical involvement and engagement for others (Haker 2001). On a
personal level, compassion means a concern for oneself and others; on the societal level, it means active
solidarity with discriminated groups in achieving and reviving recognition: (Haker 2009); and on the
institutional level of justice policies, it must be spelled out as negation of injustices. Injustices, not justice,
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reflection concerns the very foundation of ethics as such, we can still try to see whether we
may use it as the starting point of the normative reflection in bioethics, too.
In conclusion, I would hold that neither autonomy nor care ethics approaches are clear
concepts that should be used as foundational concepts of bioethics. Rather, they capture
certain aspects that may better be translated into the language of moral agency and
responsibility. One of the most challenging questions bioethics has yet to solve is how agency
and responsibility can be translated into the realm of institutional respect (for agency) and
responsibility as justice. I have suggested that further work is therefore needed in order to
develop the complementary approach of a critical hermeneutics and normative bioethics
based on human dignity and human rights.
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